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Related party transactions (RPTs) have been identified as the most common tool used 
by corporate insiders to expropriate firm’s resources, particularly in companies with 
weak governance mechanisms. In order to mitigate the problem, theorist argued that 
independent directors (INEDs), who are not beholden to the management, are better 
suited in protecting minority shareholders’ interests. Therefore, this study aims to 
examine the effect of RPTs on firm performance and to determine whether this effect 
is moderated by the proportion of INEDs and their human capital (HC) and social 
capital (SC). Firm performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), while RPTs 
are measured based on total RPTs and types of related parties. INEDs’ HC are captured 
by INEDs’ functional knowledge in accounting and finance and INEDs’ firm-specific 
knowledge, while INEDs’ SC is proxied by INEDs’ external networking. Using 
proportionate stratified random sampling, 300 non-financial firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia in the year 2013 are randomly selected. The results reveal that in general, 
RPTs have a positive effect on firm performance and this effect varies according to the 
types of parties involved in RPTs. The findings support the efficient transactions 
hypothesis that RPTs can be used for sound business reasons. The proportion of INEDs 
and all constructs for INEDs’ HC and SC are revealed to not have any moderating 
effect on the relationship between RPTs and firm performance. Therefore, the results 
are not in line with the predictions from the agency, resource dependence, human 
capital, and social capital theories. The unexpected findings raise questions of whether 
INEDs in Malaysia are truly independent or just fulfilling the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. Hence, any efforts 
undertaken by the Malaysian regulators to strengthen the roles of INEDs should focus 
on the substance rather than the form.   
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Urusniaga pihak berkaitan (UPB) telah dikenalpasti sebagai alat yang paling biasa 
digunakan oleh pihak dalaman korporat untuk menguasai sumber firma, terutamanya 
bagi syarikat yang mempunyai mekanisme tadbir urus yang lemah. Bagi menangani 
masalah tersebut, ahli teori berpendapat bahawa pengarah bebas (PB), yang tidak 
mempunyai hubungan dengan pihak pengurusan, lebih sesuai untuk melindungi 
kepentingan pemegang saham minoriti. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji 
kesan UPB ke atas prestasi firma dan untuk menentukan sama ada kesan tersebut 
disederhanakan oleh perkadaran PB serta modal insan (MI) dan modal sosial (MS) 
mereka.  Prestasi firma diukur melalui Pulangan atas Aset (ROA), dan UPB pula 
diukur berdasarkan jumlah UPB dan jenis-jenis pihak berkaitan. MI PB diwakili oleh 
pengetahuan fungsian dalam perakaunan dan kewangan serta pengetahuan khusus 
berkaitan firma, manakala MS PB pula diwakili oleh hubungan luar PB. Dengan 
menggunakan persampelan rawak strata berkadaran, sejumlah 300 buah syarikat 
bukan kewangan yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia dalam tahun 2013 telah dipilih 
secara rawak. Hasil kajian mendedahkan bahawa secara umumnya, UPB mempunyai 
kesan positif terhadap prestasi firma dan kesan ini berbeza bergantung kepada jenis-
jenis pihak yang terlibat dalam UPB. Penemuan kajian ini menyokong hipotesis 
urusniaga efisien bahawa UPB boleh digunakan untuk alasan perniagaan yang baik. 
Perkadaran PB serta semua konstruk MI dan MS PB didapati tidak mempunyai kesan 
penyederhanaan ke atas hubungan di antara UPB dan prestasi firma. Oleh yang 
demikian, keputusan kajian ini tidak selari dengan jangkaan teori agensi, pergantungan 
sumber, modal insan dan modal sosial. Penemuan yang tidak dijangka ini 
menimbulkan persoalan sama ada PB di Malaysia benar-benar bebas atau hanya 
memenuhi Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia dan Keperluan Penyenaraian Bursa 
Malaysia. Justeru, sebarang usaha yang dilakukan oleh badan kawal selia di Malaysia 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Related party transactions1 (RPTs) refer to the transfer of resources, services, or 
obligations between related parties, regardless of whether a price is charged, while a 
related party is a person or entity that is related to the entity that is preparing its 
financial statements (Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards [MFRS] 124, 2011). 
These transactions are a common business feature as firms frequently carry out their 
operations through subsidiaries, associates, and joint ventures. Thus, it is the 
companies’ responsibility to ensure that RPTs are conflict-free and are conducted at 
arm’s length.  
 
However, many abusive cases of RPTs in Asia, including Transmile Group Berhad 
(Malaysia), Satyam Computers Ltd (India), CNOOC Ltd (Hong Kong), Shinsegae 
Group (the Philippines), Asia Pulp and Paper (Indonesia), and others, demonstrate how 
RPTs ultimately benefited the company insiders (i.e. top management or controlling 
shareholders). Abusive RPTs refer to the situation where a controlling party2 of a firm 
enters into a transaction that is detrimental to non-controlling shareholders3 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2009). 
                                                             
1 Some jurisdictions use different terms to refer to RPT. For instance, Australia uses the term 
“transaction with persons in position of influence”, Hong Kong uses the term “connected transaction”, 
and Singapore uses the term “interested person transaction”. 
2 The term “controlling party” is used interchangeably with “controlling owner” and “controlling 
shareholder”. 
3 The term “non-controlling shareholders” is used interchangeably with “minority shareholders”. 
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LIST OF SAMPLE COMPANIES 
1 BINA DARULAMAN  37 JERASIA CAPITAL  
2 DKLS INDUSTRIES  38 JT INTERNATIONAL  
3 FAJARBARU BUILDER GROUP  39 KHIND HOLDINGS  
4 FUTUTECH  40 KOTRA INDUSTRIES  
5 GABUNGAN AQRS  41 LAY HONG  
6 GAMUDA  42 LII HEN INDUSTRIES 
7 HOCK SENG LEE  43 MAXWELL INTERNATIONAL  
8 IJM CORPORATION  44 MULTI SPORTS HOLDINGS LTD 
9 JAKS RESOURCES  45 NEW HOONG FATT HOLDINGS  
10 KIMLUN CORPORATION  46 NI HSIN RESOURCES  
11 PESONA METRO HOLDINGS  47 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS  
12 PRINSIPTEK CORPORATION  48 PADINI HOLDINGS  
13 SYCAL VENTURES  49 PCCS GROUP  
14 TRC SYNERGY  50 POH KONG HOLDINGS  
15 TRIPLC  51 PPB GROUP  
16 TSR CAPITAL  52 REX INDUSTRY  
17 ZECON  53 SINARIA CORPORATION  
18 AMTEK HOLDINGS  54 SPRITZER  
19 APEX HEALTHCARE  55 SYF RESOURCES  
20 APOLLO FOOD HOLDINGS  56 TAFI INDUSTRIES  
21 ASIA BRANDS  57 TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS  
22 BIOSIS GROUP  58 TEO SENG CAPITAL  
23 BONIA CORPORATION  59 TOMEI CONSOLIDATED  
24 C.I. HOLDINGS  60 TPC PLUS  
25 CCK CONSOLIDATED HOLDINGS  61 UMW HOLDINGS  
26 CHEE WAH CORPORATION  62 UPA CORPORATION  
27 EMICO HOLDINGS  63 WANG-ZHENG  
28 EURO HOLDINGS  64 
XINGQUAN INTERNATIONAL 
SPORTS HOLDINGS LIMITED 
29 EUROSPAN HOLDINGS  65 Y.S.P.SOUTHEAST ASIA HOLDING  
30 FEDERAL FURNITURE HOLDINGS (M)  66 YEE LEE CORPORATION  
31 FORMOSA PROSONIC INDUSTRIES  67 YOONG ONN CORPORATION  
32 FRASER & NEAVE HOLDINGS  68 ZHULIAN CORPORATION  
33 GOLDIS  69 GRAND CENTRAL ENTERPRISES  
34 HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES  70 LANDMARKS  
35 HUAT LAI RESOURCES  71 ABM FUJIYA  









73 AJIYA  109 HIL INDUSTRIES  
74 ANCOM  110 HO WAH GENTING  
75 A-RANK  111 IMASPRO CORPORATION  
76 ASTRAL SUPREME  112 INGRESS CORPORATION  
77 B.I.G. INDUSTRIES  113 JOHORE TIN  
78 BOUSTEAD HEAVY INDUSTRIES  114 KECK SENG (MALAYSIA)  
79 BOX-PAK (MALAYSIA)  115 KIAN JOO CAN FACTORY  
80 BP PLASTICS HOLDING  116 KNM GROUP  
81 BRIGHT PACKAGING INDUSTRY  117 KOMARKCORP  
82 CB INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT HOLDING  118 KOSSAN RUBBER INDUSTRIES  
83 CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION  119 KUMPULAN H & L HIGH-TECH  
84 CHINA AUTOMOBILE PARTS HOLDING 120 KUMPULAN POWERNET  
85 CME GROUP  121 KYM HOLDINGS  
86 CN ASIA CORPORATION  122 LCTH CORPORATION  
87 CONCRETE ENGINEERING PRODUCTS  123 LEADER STEEL HOLDINGS  
88 CSC STEEL HOLDINGS  124 LEWEKO RESOURCES  
89 CYL CORPORATION  125 LION CORPORATION  
90 DELLOYD VENTURES  126 LUSTER INDUSTRIES  
91 DENKO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION  127 MALAYSIA SMELTING  
92 D'NONCE TECHNOLOGY  128 MALAYSIA STEEL WORKS (KL)  
93 DOLOMITE CORPORATION  129 MAXTRAL INDUSTRY  
94 DRB-HICOM  130 METROD HOLDINGS  
95 DUFU TECHNOLOGY CORP.  131 MIECO CHIPBOARD  
96 EG INDUSTRIES  132 MINETECH RESOURCES  
97 EKSONS CORPORATION  133 NARRA INDUSTRIES  
98 EP MANUFACTURING  134 NWP HOLDINGS  
99 FAVELLE FAVCO  135 PENSONIC HOLDINGS  
100 FIBON  136 PETRONAS GAS  
101 FOCUS LUMBER  137 RAPID SYNERGY  
102 GLOBALTEC FORMATION  138 RUBBEREX CORPORATION (M)  
103 GOH BAN HUAT  139 SAM ENGINEERING & EQUIPMENT  
104 GOLSTA SYNERGY  140 SARAWAK CABLE  
105 GSB GROUP  141 
SARAWAK CONSOLIDATED 
INDUSTRIES 
106 HALEX HOLDINGS  142 SEACERA GROUP  
107 HEVEABOARD  143 SEREMBAN ENGINEERING  






















145 SKP RESOURCES  181 UNITED MALACCA  
146 SLP RESOURCES  182 A & M REALTY  
147 SMIS CORPORATION  183 AMCORP PROPERTIES  
148 SOUTHERN STEEL  184 BERTAM ALLIANCE  
149 STONE MASTER CORPORATION  185 DAMANSARA REALTY  
150 SUCCESS TRANSFO 186 ENCORP  
151 SUPPORTIVE INTERNATIONAL  187 GRAND HOOVER  
152 TAS OFFSHORE  188 I-BERHAD 
153 TECNIC GROUP  189 IJM LAND  
154 TEKALA CORPORATION  190 KELADI MAJU  
155 TIEN WAH PRESS HOLDINGS  191 KSL HOLDINGS  
156 TURIYA  192 LAND & GENERAL  
157 UCHI TECHNOLOGIES  193 LBI CAPITAL  
158 VTI VINTAGE  194 LBS BINA GROUP  
159 WHITE HORSE  195 LIEN HOE CORPORATION  
160 WONG ENGINEERING CORPORATION  196 MAGNA PRIMA  
161 YI-LAI  197 MALAYSIA AICA  
162 YLI HOLDINGS  198 MALAYSIA PACIFIC CORPORATION  
163 YOKOHAMA INDUSTRIES  199 MKH  
164 LINGKARAN TRANS KOTA HOLDINGS  200 MUI PROPERTIES  
165 SILK HOLDINGS  201 NAIM HOLDINGS  
166 DUTALAND  202 ORIENTAL INTEREST  
167 FAR EAST HOLDINGS  203 OSK PROPERTY HOLDINGS  
168 GENTING PLANTATIONS  204 PERDUREN (M) BERHAD 
169 GOPENG BERHAD 205 PETALING TIN BERHAD 
170 INNOPRISE PLANTATIONS  206 PJ DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS  
171 KLUANG RUBBER COMPANY 207 SELANGOR DREDGING  
172 KRETAM HOLDINGS  208 SHL CONSOLIDATED  
173 KWANTAS CORPORATION  209 SYMPHONY LIFE  
174 MHC PLANTATIONS BHD. 210 TA GLOBAL  
175 RIVERVIEW RUBBER ESTATES  211 TAHPS GROUP  
176 SARAWAK OIL PALMS  212 TIGER SYNERGY  
177 SARAWAK PLANTATION  213 TRINITY CORPORATION  
178 TDM BERHAD 214 TROPICANA CORPORATION  
179 TSH RESOURCES  215 UEM SUNRISE  






217 SONA PETROLEUM BERHAD 248 DIALOG GROUP  
218 AMTEL HOLDINGS  249 EASTLAND EQUITY  
219 CBSA BERHAD 250 EDEN INC. BERHAD 
220 D&O GREEN TECHNOLOGIES  251 EFFICIENT E-SOLUTIONS  
221 DIGISTAR CORPORATION  252 EITA RESOURCES  
222 ELSOFT RESEARCH  253 EMAS KIARA INDUSTRIES  
223 EXCEL FORCE MSC  254 FIAMMA HOLDINGS  
224 GLOBETRONICS TECHNOLOGY  255 GEORGE KENT (MALAYSIA)  
225 KESM INDUSTRIES  256 HARBOUR-LINK GROUP  
226 MALAYSIAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIES  257 IHH HEALTHCARE  
227 THETA EDGE  258 INTEGRATED LOGISTICS  
228 VITROX CORPORATION  259 INTEGRAX  
229 WILLOWGLEN MSC  260 KAMDAR GROUP (M) BERHAD 
230 AEON CO. (M) BHD 261 KBES BERHAD 
231 AIRASIA X BERHAD 262 KELINGTON GROUP BERHAD 
232 AMWAY (MALAYSIA) HOLDINGS  263 KNUSFORD BERHAD 
233 ASTRO MALAYSIA HOLDINGS  264 KPJ HEALTHCARE  
234 ATLAN HOLDINGS  265 KPS CONSORTIUM  
235 AYS VENTURES  266 LFE CORPORATION  
236 BERJAYA CORPORATION  267 LUXCHEM CORPORATION  
237 BERJAYA MEDIA  268 MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM  
238 BHS INDUSTRIES  269 MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS  
239 BORNEO OIL BERHAD 270 MASTERSKILL EDUCATION GROUP  
240 BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS  271 METRONIC GLOBAL  
241 CENTURY LOGISTICS HOLDINGS  272 MY E.G. SERVICES  
242 CHEETAH HOLDINGS  273 
NATIONWIDE EXPRESS COURIER 
SERVICES  
243 COMPLETE LOGISTIC SERVICES  274 NCB HOLDINGS  
244 COMPUGATES HOLDINGS  275 OCB BERHAD 
245 CYCLE & CARRIAGE BINTANG  276 OGAWA WORLD BERHAD 
246 DAYA MATERIALS BERHAD 277 OLDTOWN BERHAD 












279 PANSAR BERHAD   
280 PANTECH GROUP HOLDINGS BERHAD   
281 PARKSON HOLDINGS BERHAD   
282 PDZ HOLDINGS BHD   
283 PHARMANIAGA BERHAD   
284 PRESTARIANG BERHAD   
285 PROGRESSIVE IMPACT CORPORATION    
286 SALCON BERHAD   
287 SAMCHEM HOLDINGS BERHAD   
288 SAPURAKENCANA PETROLEUM    
289 SCOMI ENERGY SERVICES BHD   
290 SCOMI GROUP BERHAD   
291 SHIN YANG SHIPPING CORPORATION    
292 SIME DARBY BERHAD   
293 STAR PUBLICATIONS    
294 SYMPHONY HOUSE BHD   
295 TANJUNG OFFSHORE BERHAD   
296 TELEKOM MALAYSIA BERHAD   
297 TH HEAVY ENGINEERING BERHAD   
298 THE STORE CORPORATION BERHAD   
299 TURBO-MECH BERHAD   





















Related entities include the following: 
 Transaction with subsidiaries 
 Transaction with associates  
 Transaction with joint ventures   
 
Related persons include the following: 
 Transaction with directors 
 Transaction with major shareholders 
 Transaction with persons connected with directors or major shareholders  






















An Example of Related Party Transactions Classifications 
The partial information is extracted from the annual report of ANCOM Berhad for the 
financial year 2013: 
36. RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES 
 
(a) Identities of related parties 
 
Parties are considered to be related to the Group if the Group has the ability, directly 
or indirectly, to control the party or exercise significant influence over the party in 
making financial and operating decisions, or vice versa, or where the Group and the 
party are subject to common control or common significant influence. Related parties 
could be individuals or other entities. 
 
The Company has controlling related party relationship with its direct and indirect 
subsidiaries as disclosed in Note 41 to the financial statements. 
 
(b) In addition to the transactions detailed elsewhere in the financial statements, the 







Sales to a company in which a Director of the Company 





Purchase from a company in which a Director of the 




Sales to associates: 
Nufarm Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.  







Purchases from associates: 





Services rendered by a company in which certain 






Professional legal fees paid to a firm of which a Director 





Insurance premium paid to a company in which a 



















Appendix C Continued 
 
(d) Compensation of key management personnel 
 
Key management personnel are those persons having the authority and responsibility 
for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the entity, directly and 
indirectly, including any Director (whether executive or otherwise) of the Group. 
 
The remuneration of Directors and other key management personnel of the Group and 







Short term employee benefits 28,596 30,939 
Contributions to defined contribution plan 1,396 1,917 
Benefits-in-kind 1,651 261 



































Notes: VIF less than 10 indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem 
(Gujarati, 2003)  
 
 











Notes: VIF less than 10 indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem 










Appendix D Continued 




RPTs 1.095  
RPTRE  1.078 
RPTRP  1.094 
INEDPROP 1.258 1.283 
BIG4 1.271 1.272 
BSIZE 1.408 1.421 
FSIZE 1.739 1.748 
LEV 1.193 1.199 
CSOWN 1.128 1.136 
CSTYPE 1.504 1.507 
MOWN 1.352 1.356 








RPTs 1.096  
RPTRE  1.045 
RPTRP  1.089 
INEDFUNK 1.087 1.088 
BIG4 1.264 1.265 
BSIZE 1.219 1.219 
FSIZE 1.726 1.733 
LEV 1.172 1.179 
CSOWN 1.094 1.100 
CSTYPE 1.516 1.523 
MOWN 1.343 1.344 









Appendix D Continued 




RPTs 1.105  
RPTRE  1.049 
RPTRP  1.086 
INEDSPEK 1.088 1.143 
BIG4 1.299 1.299 
BSIZE 1.199 1.202 
FSIZE 1.733 1.739 
LEV 1.180 1.183 
CSOWN 1.090 1.096 
CSTYPE 1.504 1.509 
MOWN 1.319 1.320 
Notes: VIF less than 10 indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 
2003)  
 




RPTs 1.116  
RPTRE  1.077 
RPTRP  1.082 
INEDNET 1.160 1.160 
BIG4 1.297 1.297 
BSIZE 1.206 1.208 
FSIZE 1.767 1.775 
LEV 1.184 1.189 
CSOWN 1.098 1.104 
CSTYPE 1.511 1.522 
MOWN 1.320 1.321 
Notes: VIF less than 10 indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 
2003) 
